Given that Indian Americans heavily favor the Democratic Party, their disapproval of Trump is to be expected. But this disapproval does not mechanically extend to Modi. Ratings between zero and forty-nine mean that respondents do not feel favorable toward the person or do not care for the person or entity, a rating of fifty means that respondents are indifferent toward them, and ratings between fifty-one and one hundred mean that respondents feel favorable and warm toward them.
After determining whether respondents were familiar with the individuals or organizations in question, the survey asked respondents to rate them on the aforementioned scale. Seventy percent of respondents are familiar with the BJP and Modi, while around 60 percent are familiar with the Congress Party and its vice president, Rahul Gandhi.
Fourteen percent of respondents report not being familiar with any of these five names. Familiarity is correlated with place of birth: respondents born in the United States are much less likely to be familiar with the individuals and organizations in question than their foreign-born counterparts. For instance, while more than 80 percent of foreign-born respondents report familiarity with both the BJP and Modi, just around 50 percent of U. The results of the feeling thermometer question exhibit interesting variation the relative sample sizes for each individual or organization are noted along the x-axis of figure The mean thermometer rating for the BJP is fifty-seven, nearly identical to Modi at fifty-eight.
By contrast, in India, Modi is typically rated much more favorably than his party. All other names receive ratings below fifty, which means that respondents do not view them warmly, on average. The RSS enjoys a mean rating just below the midpoint at forty-six.
Indian Americans harbor positive feelings toward the Democratic Party and its leaders: both Biden and the Democratic Party earn a mean rating of sixty-four, while Vice President—elect Kamala Harris earns a Thus, these actors are rated more favorably than either the BJP or Modi, but the gaps are not wide.
Indian Americans who identify as Democrats or Republicans do differ in their evaluations of Indian political leaders and organizations. Conversely, respondents who identify as Democrats give higher ratings to the Congress Party and Rahul Gandhi, although the gaps are much smaller. Note that irrespective of party affiliation, respondents rate Modi, the BJP, and the RSS on the warmer end of the spectrum mean ratings close to fifty and above.
So while Republicans are more favorably disposed to these actors, it is not accurate to conclude that Democrats harbor un favorable views. When it comes to the Congress Party and Gandhi, however, both Democrats and Republicans are relatively bearish: even the mean ratings for them among Democratic respondents does not rise above fifty.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the typical Modi supporter in the United States is male, older, Republican-leaning, Hindu, and hails from Gujarat or other regions of India where the BJP is traditionally dominant. But how does support for Modi correlate with other subgroups? Using the rich demographic data the survey collected on respondents, figure 15 sketches out the defining characteristics of Modi supporters in America.
To separate supporters from nonsupporters, the figure compares the characteristics of respondents who approve of the job Modi is doing with those who disapprove. There are four major takeaways from this analysis.
Visually, the dark blue bars to the right indicating approval are systematically larger than the light blue bars on the left indicating disapproval. Second, older Indian Americans tend to be more favorably disposed toward Modi. His approval is highest among those above the age of fifty 55 percent , but it is nearly as high among thirty- to forty-nine-year-olds 53 percent. However, there is no clear gender disparity: men and women approve of Modi in nearly equal proportions 49 and 50 percent, respectively.
Third, Modi fares better among non-U. Fifty-three percent of non-citizens and 52 percent of naturalized Indian Americans approve of Modi compared to 44 percent of U. For those who have lived in the United States between eleven and twenty-five years, it stands more than 10 percentage points higher 57 percent ; and for those here a decade or less, it stands at 55 percent. The relationship between duration of stay in the United States and support for Modi could be either due to informational or selection effects.
More recent arrivals are likely to be more plugged into the Indian political scene. At the same time, those who came to the United States earlier likely hailed from an Indian middle class forged in a polity dominated by the Congress Party, while recent migrants arrived during a time of BJP political dominance. Fourth, there are also striking patterns when analyzing the data by occupation and region of origin. Indian Americans employed as engineers the category also includes architects and computer scientists are more supportive of Modi than nonengineers: 61 percent of engineers approve of Modi compared to 48 percent of nonengineers and 47 percent of those without a job.
This is not simply a byproduct of educational attainment: at every level of education, engineers express greater levels of support for Modi than nonengineers.
Conversely, it is lowest among those from Eastern India speaking languages such as Assamese, Bengali, or Odia at 38 percent and those from primarily English-speaking families at 34 percent. The selection effects inherent in immigration raise the question of whether Indian immigrants in the United States are more pro-Modi than Indians living in India. If political views are universal, then Indian Americans should exhibit similar responses to similar questions in both the United States and India.
If, however, views are contextual, then Indian Americans might hold more liberal views about policy in the United States and simultaneously more conservative views on policy in India. But even in that case, there is an additional question: liberal or conservative relative to whom? Answering these questions poses the methodological challenge of comparing markedly different political contexts.
The IAAS attempted to overcome this challenge by asking respondents about contentious policy issues that are the subject of ongoing debates in both the United States and India. While the survey could have probed respondents on numerous policy issues, the researchers selected five issues in India that closely mirror ongoing policy debates in the United States so as to make comparative analyses possible. The survey first asked respondents whether they support or oppose the following five policy issues of contemporary salience in India:.
Figure 16 displays the share of respondents who strongly oppose, somewhat oppose, somewhat support, or strongly support each of these propositions. Fifty-five percent support the former, and 51 percent support the latter. However, respondents are more opposed than not to two other issues: the use of police force against peaceful protesters 65 percent oppose and government crackdowns on the media 69 percent oppose.
On the fifth issue of caste-based affirmative action in higher education admissions, the community is divided—with 47 percent supporting this measure and 53 percent opposing it.
Next, the survey asked respondents two sets of additional questions on similar policy issues in the United States and in a generic context with no country-specific application.
The specific wording of the three sets of questions is contained in Appendix B. Thus, the study has three sets of attitudinal data with which it can construct a comparison: general principles or norms, their application in an Indian context, and their application in a U. Figure 17 integrates these three data points for each of the five issues to explore how views of Indian Americans diverge across contexts.
Regarding the question of whether Indian Americans are more liberal in the United States and more conservative in India, the answer is a tentative yes. On the issue of the equal treatment of people belonging to different religious faiths, 90 percent of Indian Americans support this notion in a general context. But only 60 percent support the proposition in the U.
On the question of illegal immigration, 69 percent of Indian Americans support the idea of more permissive policies toward undocumented immigrants in general. In the U. In the Indian context, just 45 percent support more permissive policies by expressing opposition to the proposed all-India NRC.
There is no such divergence on the issue of the use of police force against peaceful protesters. Sixty-five percent of respondents support restrained police action in a generic context—which is identical to the share in the Indian context. Regarding protecting the media from government censorship or retribution, 87 percent of respondents are in favor of the notion in general, while 72 percent are in favor in the United States and 69 percent are in favor in India.
Finally, there is the question of affirmative action in university admissions. Sixty-one percent support the notion in a general context, but the data suggest lower levels of support in the United States 54 percent and in India 47 percent. One interesting question that arises is how the views of Indian Americans compare to those of the U. This is a difficult question to address given the paucity of comparable data and the idiosyncrasies of survey question wording. With those caveats in mind, table 3 offers suggestive comparisons on two issues: the protection of the media from government censorship and the equal treatment of religious minorities.
The table includes responses from the IAAS—as well as comparable survey data from the United States and India—that might capture general public opinion in those two countries as a whole. On the subject of media freedoms, the share of the U.
In fact, this proportion is greater even than that of IAAS respondents who are generally in favor of a free media. When it comes to the comparison with the Indian population, the positions are reversed: Indian American respondents express greater support for media freedoms than the average Indian respondent in a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, although the share who believe a free media is important is not too dissimilar in the IAAS and Pew survey. Regarding the equal treatment of religious minorities, 90 percent of IAAS respondents are in favor in a general context, but fewer are supportive in the U.
Sixty percent of IAAS respondents favor the equal treatment of minorities in the context of immigration compared to 48 percent of American respondents in a Pew survey. This brief comparison suggests that one must be careful in making inferences about Indian American public opinion because much depends on the issue at stake and the identity of the comparator.
This is a reasonable proxy measure for popular support for democratic governance. A slim majority of respondents believe that democracy is preferable over a strong leader in India 52 percent and in the United States 56 percent. However, while popular assessments of democracy might not differ, there is a significant divergence of views on the question of majoritarianism in the two countries.
According to the Singapore Police Force, the man reportedly told the woman to wear her mask properly, leading to an altercation. Then, it will come to Singaporean Indians Over the last year, the conversation about systemic racism in the US has exploded, alongside the Black Lives Matter protests as well as the anti-Asian incidents following the Covid pandemic.
Out of the reported incidents, With the advent of the B. Social media users have highlighted posts and messages that seem to presume all Indians are responsible for spreading the variant. She is extremely worried for the safety of the community. India needs free, fair, non-hyphenated and questioning journalism even more as it faces multiple crises.
But the news media is in a crisis of its own. There have been brutal layoffs and pay-cuts. The best of journalism is shrinking, yielding to crude prime-time spectacle. ThePrint has the finest young reporters, columnists and editors working for it.
Sustaining journalism of this quality needs smart and thinking people like you to pay for it. Whether you live in India or overseas, you can do it here. Support Our Journalism. Christians trying to Divide Hindus in America.
Remember the convert is the worst. In Fiji Christian indians throw Hindu and Muslims to the wolves. This is impossible, these people are rubbing their eyes. These guys spread lies in early s that kerala hindus throw their babies under chariot wheel as sacrifice , the swami Vivekanand asked them why you hate us so much what we have done. These guys are afraid that their ideologies are collapsing now.
These guys are afraid that asians religions are not personality based religions they are idea based religions, even if you remove Krishna , buddha out of the picture their religion still stand high but if you remove resurrection of Jesus and Prophet having met angel Gabriel it falls like a pack of cards.
We will fix our house.. Harry, noxious Hindutvaist and online Babu Bajrangi though he very likely is, has nonetheless every bloody right to write about what he likes. You Sir, may not agree with Harry. But it is also your right to counter him. But you cannot question his right to talk about Islam. Indeed, your attitude lies at the root of the problems that Muslims face in many countries — the rules of Islam cannot be subservient to the rules and laws made by democratically elected Parliaments.
France is the latest example of this clash between the values of a staunchly secular, modern, democratic country and the atavistic ideas your ilk brings to the table.
Well, I have news for you Mr Gazzali. Whilst there are a lot of public expressions of condemnation of this barbaric act by Muslim community leaders in France, in private, are Muslims truly sad at what happened? And most people in France are aware of the fact that many of these tears being shed by Muslim community leaders are probably crocodile tears. But the despicable attitude that you project will perhaps become clearer to you if you had listened to French journalist Caroline Fourest who said:.
They fled Russia. France opened its doors, gave them sanctuary and the possibility of a fresh start. They were free to practise Islam and be Muslim in France. And what do we get in return? We will fix our house. Let Live and live yourself. The two bombings killed between , and , people, most of whom were civilians.
If he had listened to Satan, he would not have died on Cross. You guys promote the nonsense that Christ did not die on Cross to cover up sacrifice of innocent.
Only true about Christians is Jesus was son of their god and in case of Muslim prophet Mohammed was messenger of Allah. So both of these faith are half truths. Allah, the God [ i. You guys went to Mecca and threw stones at Satan, why are you complaining when you are hit with weapons?
You are getting payback in your own coin. The way they deal with their Harsh Mander, Ram Puniyani.. Varghese George.. When you say that prominent writers and human rights activists like Harsh Mander, Varghese George etc. Not to speak of other intellectuals and writers like Sri M. Your saffron gaurakshak friends were behind all these murders Harry saab. Maybe I should start addressing you as Taliban Gaurakshak Harry, in recognition of the fact that you have double the bigotry of any one of these thugs.
What you have written about Harry is true. He will not deny it. He is a Hindu fascist, that does not trouble him.
A bit like SG. Vajpayee used to pose as a Hindu liberal. But the moment a Muslim or Pakistan criticised him, he reverted back to his small minded Hindu ways, and responded like a cheap Hindu. You are like that. Your effort to call me Taliban, Ajmal Kasab Osmaetc.
I have never referred to them or Pakistan, or expressed them as models. I have criticised the damage Hindu fascism and indeed Hinduism has done to India with the caste system. You have to refute me like you do with Harry — in most cases you do not, because what I say cannot be refuted. You react to me in Hindutva style, with whataboutery. Mehdi trashed him more. Madhav is a pathetic Hindutva Hindu. You are scarcely better when you respond to me with Ajmal Kasab.
It will be better if you decided which camp you are in, and improved your mentality, controlled your emotions, and did not lash out wildly. It is better you remained focused on what is going to break up India — it will be Harry type Hindus, not Kasab or Taliban.
The second reason is he is Keralite, Keralites in general are good as yes men or clerks. They readily betray their talented fellow Keralite Hindus out of jealousy or petty benefits.
Good example is Sukumar, who framed S Nambi Narayanan, cryogenic scientist. The whole Nambi Narayanan episode was absurd. To assume that that such high positioned person would fall for such ghastly women is ridiculous.
If the woman was like Mehr Tarar, for whom Shashi Tharoor fell for or Ishrat Jahan for whom Pranesh Pillai fall for, enough to convert, is believable, but not these Maldiva women. Only Rasgolla would fall for such women because they might carry his jihad plus he can keep multiple wives. Kili can refute you, but not me. He responds to me even more pathetically than you do.
Even you can do better than call for my ban! Bur he is certainly better read than you, but like you, he cannot digest criticism of Hindus. I have heard Kerala is the most advanced state in all indicators : education, healthcare, governance. They even seem to have international recognition like it is a separate country from India. They got international respect for the way they handled the flood. And also how they have handled Covid; they did not even turn out the migrants.
I saw a BBC interview with the Kerala health minister Shailaja where the interviewer asked what she could teach Britain. The worst state people in India are Gujaratis. They are corrupt and communal. It is now the centre of Hindu Nazism. Gujarati, Marwari are smartest people. They can not be swindled by you guys. It is too bad that Gujaratis were not ruling India directly in , otherwise mistakes like Kashmir ,China would have been avoided.
Kerala is kept afloat by Keralites working in gulf. Islam has nothing to offer to cultured noble Arya. I never called for a blanket ban on you, but of individual comments from you where you misuse the commenting platform of The Print to air your visceral hatred of Hindus and Hinduism.
And I stand by my request to have such vile comments banned. And again, you are no better than Gaurakshak Harry. Harry regards all Muslims as extremists and Indian Muslims as some sort of a 5th column; you regard all Hindus as supporters of Hindutva and Hinduism itself as something obnoxious and all Hindus as infidels in dire need of being civilised.
You and Gaurakshak Harry are different sides of the same debased coin that only hurl invective at each other and at your respective faiths instead of arguments. Indeed, neither of you make arguments that are worthy of being refuted — there is nothing to refute in abuse and hate speech. Of course, you rasgolla or the team that writes under that name write better English than Gaurakshak Harry. You rasgolla perhaps volunteer for some similar Islamist outfit, vomiting your equally crude Islamo-fascism.
What you both have in common is that you peddle hate — as simple as that. And ensure that Hindus and Muslims diverge more and more from each other. Thanks for the response — your usual mixture of fiction, fibs and flawed analysis. This proportion declines dramatically for Hindus, with only 21 percent reporting regularly attending religious services. A majority of Hindus 52 percent report attending religious services once or twice a month or just a few times a year, while another 25 percent report seldom or never attending religious services.
Apart from attending religious services, the survey asks respondents how frequently they pray outside of the times they attend religious services. Forty percent of respondents report praying either several times a day or once a day—significantly more than the 27 percent of the sample that attends religious services at least once a week. The share of Indian Americans who pray either several times a day or once a day is slightly below the U.
Twenty-four percent of Indian Americans report seldom or never praying. Clear differences along religious lines are evident in the responses to the question on the frequency of prayer see figure 9. Not only are Hindus less likely to report attending religious services, but they are also less likely to say that they pray. Forty percent of Hindus say they pray once or several times a day—substantially less than the 58 percent of Muslims or 66 percent of Christians who answer similarly.
Hindus are also more likely than Muslims or Christians to state that they pray a few times a month, seldom, or never. Finally, the survey explores the issue of caste. Caste has long been a sensitive and controversial issue in discussions about the Indian American community. Media reports about caste discrimination in the technology hub of Silicon Valley—where a large number of Indian Americans are employed—and a heated controversy over whether caste should be a part of history textbooks in the state of California have brought the issue to the forefront once more.
However, the study is not based on a representative sample, raising questions about the generalizability of its findings.
Forty-seven percent of Hindu respondents report identifying with a caste, which means the majority 53 percent said that they do not personally identify with a caste group of any kind.
However, there is marked variation by place of birth. Whereas 53 percent of foreign-born Hindu Indian Americans affiliate with a caste group, 34 percent of U. There is no variation at all based on duration of stay in the United States.
Hindus who recently arrived in the United States are just as likely to identify with a caste group as those who have been here for a quarter-century or more. Overall, there are respondents in the IAAS sample who belong to the Hindu faith but only who report identifying with a caste group.
Of this latter group, the overwhelming majority—83 percent—categorize themselves as General or upper caste. One should treat these findings with caution. First, as noted above, the data on caste identification is restricted to Hindu respondents. Therefore, the sample size from which these percentages is derived is small—just one-half of the overall IAAS sample. Second, given the presence of SCs among some non-Hindu religious groups, it is likely that the absolute number of SCs—if not the percentage—in the IAAS sample is higher.
This section explores how Indian Americans view the subject of their own identity. First, the survey asked respondents how important being Indian is to their identity. Overall, 41 percent of respondents rate it as very important and another 37 percent rate it as somewhat important.
In fact, that is precisely what the data suggest see figure Eighty-three percent of foreign-born Indian Americans claim being Indian is either very or somewhat important to their identity, compared to 70 percent of U. The differences are most pronounced among those who say being Indian is very important to them. On the other end of the spectrum, 30 percent of Indian Americans born in the United States answer that being Indian is either somewhat or very unimportant to their identity—a response given by just 17 percent of foreign-born Indian Americans.
However, the magnitude of the effect is modest. Fifty percent of respondents who have been in the United States for ten years or less say that being Indian is very important to their identity, compared to 42 percent for those who have been in the United States for more than twenty-five years. Indian Americans in this latter category are also more inclined to state that being Indian is somewhat or very unimportant to them.
Eighty-eight percent of Hindus say being Indian is very or somewhat important to them, compared to 79 percent of Christians and 66 percent of Muslims. The IAAS asks respondents how they self-identify; after all, identities are liminal and individuals might identify with any number of identity categories. To probe this issue, the survey provides respondents with eight identity categories and asks them which of the following best describes their background.
The results are displayed in figure As one might expect, first-generation foreign-born and second-generation U. Indian Americans who are born in the United States are more likely to identify as Indian American 48 to 40 percent and markedly less likely to identify as Indian just 11 percent compared to 33 percent of foreign-born Indian Americans.
Self-identification also varies by religion. Just 24 percent of Indian Americans who have lived in the United States between one and ten years identify as Indian American, compared to 41 percent of those who have been here for eleven to twenty-five years and 53 percent of those who have been here for more than twenty-five years.
According to the data, the modal response of Indian Americans is that they weigh the two sides of their identity equally: 45 percent feel equally Indian and American. Thirty-one percent state that they feel more American than Indian and 19 percent state the converse—that they feel more Indian than American.
A very small proportion, just 5 percent, state that they feel neither Indian nor American. Predictably, responses vary by place of birth see figure Indeed, a plurality 44 percent of Indian Americans born in the United States say that they feel more American than Indian compared to 23 percent of foreign-born respondents. At the other end of the spectrum, 24 percent of foreign-born respondents feel more Indian than American, a sentiment shared by just 11 percent of their U.
Interestingly, those born outside of the United States are most likely to say that they feel equally Indian and American—nearly one in two fall into this category as do 38 percent of U.
This section reviews two aspects of the social context within which Indian Americans operate. The first part looks at three types of engagement: civic, political, and cultural. The survey asks respondents whether—in the past one year—they participated in any of four common methods of civic engagement: working with others in their community to solve a problem; performing voluntary community service without pay; attending a public meeting, such as for a school board or city council; or attending a protest march, demonstration, or rally.
The most common activity is performing community service, something 20 percent of respondents engaged in, followed by working with others in their community 15 percent , attending a public meeting 13 percent , and attending a protest or demonstration 11 percent. Figure 14 disaggregates the results by place of birth and citizenship status. Respondents are classified as belonging to one of three categories: U. A much higher share of U. Seventeen percent of U. Community service is the most popular form of civic engagement for Indian Americans of all types.
Twenty-six percent of U. The one slight deviation in the overall pattern of civic engagement is found in the final category—working with others in your community to solve a problem. Once more, U. However, non-citizens are about as likely as foreign-born citizens to engage in the resolution of community issues 12 percent versus 11 percent. The survey also queries respondents about whether they participated, over the past twelve months, in any of five political activities: volunteering or working on a political campaign; posting comments online about politics; discussing politics with friends and family; contributing money to a candidate, party, or campaign organization; or contacting their elected representative or another government official.
Nearly one in two respondents 45 percent report discussing politics in the past year—by far the most common activity. Twenty-one percent report posting comments about political issues online. Contributing financially to campaigns 14 percent , contacting an elected representative or government official 12 percent , and volunteering on a political campaign 9 percent are less popular activities.
As with civic engagement, U. This finding tracks with other studies of immigrant communities. When it comes to discussing politics with family and friends, there are only small differences across citizenship status. Forty-seven percent of U. When it comes to online discussions of politics, 28 percent of U. On the matter of campaign finance, one-fifth of U.
The low rate of political giving for non-citizens is expected given that non-citizens are forbidden from making political donations unless they are permanent residents that is, they possess a green card. Relatively few Indian Americans across the board report contacting an elected representative or other government official: 15 percent of U. Finally, volunteering or working on a political campaign appears to be the least common form of political engagement.
Unsurprisingly, just 4 percent of non-citizens participated in this activity, while 8 percent of foreign-born citizens and 14 percent of U.
It is worth pointing out that nearly one-third 32 percent of respondents report not engaging in any of the civic or political activities listed on the survey. However, non-citizens and foreign-born citizens report nonparticipation at roughly twice the rate of U. The February IAAS study examined the degree to which Indian Americans remain connected to India through cultural outlets such as Indian food, movies or television, and art, dance, or music.
The survey asks respondents whether they participate in a set of holidays, some associated with India and others that are either associated with the United States or are more global in nature.
Interestingly, among IAAS respondents, Diwali emerges as the most celebrated holiday—63 percent of respondents report that they celebrate the Indian festival of lights see figure Independence Day July 4 ranks second 57 percent , followed by Christmas 54 percent. Given the relatively small share of Christians in the Indian American community, this suggests that Christmas is celebrated more on cultural than religious grounds. Fewer than one in ten respondents 9 percent do not participate in any of these seven holidays.
The differences are especially stark for Diwali and Indian Independence Day, where the gap between the two groups is on the order of 20 percentage points. Diwali and Holi are largely celebrated by Hindus, while very few non-Muslims commemorate Eid. Interestingly, more than half of all Hindu respondents 56 percent celebrate Christmas compared to just one in five Muslim respondents. This section reviews some basic characteristics of the social networks of Indian Americans.
The objective of this inquiry is to assess to what extent Indian Americans associate with other Indian Americans relative to those from outside the community. The modal response—selected by 38 percent of respondents—is that some of their friends are of Indian origin. Thirty-six percent report that either all or most of their friends are of Indian origin, while 21 percent report that very few or none of their friends are of Indian origin.
For instance, the social networks of an Indian American in Wyoming where there are very few Indian Americans will likely be dominated by non-Indian Americans. But in New Jersey, where there is a significant concentration of Indian Americans, Indian Americans are more likely to associate with their own. Indeed, the survey finds that in counties with more Indian American households, respondents are significantly more likely to say their social networks are dominated by fellow Indian Americans see figure As figure 18 shows, 43 percent of foreign-born Indian Americans have a social network dominated by Indian-origin friends, compared to 25 percent of respondents born in the United States adding up the shares of those who say all or most of their friends are of Indian origin.
Homophily—the tendency of individuals to associate with people similar to themselves—is a strong determinant of social networks. Figure 19 displays the responses to this question, collapsing five response categories into three for ease of exposition.
Forty-eight percent of respondents report that most or all of their Indian friends share their religious faith, while another 36 percent report that some of their friends are coreligionists. In contrast, there is more variation on the dimensions of region and caste. Twenty-nine percent of respondents report that most or all of their friends are from the same region of India. Forty-three percent report that some are, while 23 percent say that hardly any or none are.
The pattern is similar when it comes to caste, although nearly one-quarter of respondents claim they do not know what share of their friends belong to their caste group, suggesting that caste is a less salient category for a significant segment of IAAS respondents.
0コメント